Q60 



I 











'6~ 
/ 



THE NATION'S RELATIONS TO ITS 
ISLAND POSSESSIONS. 



SPEECH 



OF 



IIOK JON" ATI-IAN BOSS, 

or ^-ERMONT, 



IN THE 



SEE"ATE OF THE UlN'ITED STATES, 



TUESDAY, JANUARY 23, 1900. 



T 






■w^A-smiTG-Tonsr. 
1900. 



418S 



5 



.■R? 



SPEECH 

OF 

HON. JONATHAN KOSS 



OUTLYIXa DEPENDENCIES. 



That by tlio recent troatv with !?pain tho initea tetaros tak-e ine sovereignty over 
anrl over the Philippine Islands under the duty to use and exercise it for the gen- 
' and highest interest of tho people of the United States and the inhabitants of th« 
estrained by tho provisions of the Constitution; and over Cuba, under the duty to 



Mr. ROSS. Mr. Prfsitlent, I ask leave to call up the resolution.s submitted bj 
rue on the isth instant. 

The PRESIDINCt OFFICER. The Chair lays before the Senate the resolutiona, 
which will be read. 

The Secretary read the resolutions submitted by Mr. Ross on the 18th instant, 
as follows: 

Re.inlrecJ, That the provisions of the Constitution do notj unaided by act of Congress, extend 
over Puerto Rico and the Philippine Isl.ands. , , ,, ... 

lirsolvcd. That by tho recent treaty with Spain the United Statestake^the sovereignty over 

Puerto Kico ; ' ' ' ' ' ..■...- ■. _. .- .^ » _ 

eral welfare ; , 

islands, unrestrained by tho provisions of 

exercise it for the? pacification of the i.sland. 

Rvsoh-tJ. That the successful discbarue of this duty demands the establishment of a separata 
departmc^nt of Government to take charge of ail outlying depondc-ncies of tho United States, 
and the p.assago of a general law making appointments therein ucnipolitical. 

Mr, ROSS. Mr. President. I think it is entirely evident that all Senators do not 
take the same view of our relations to the Philippine Islands, Puerto Rico, and our 
other dependencies. I shall present my own view. 

I have always thought It wiser to give attention to present conditions, and to 
the discharge "of present duties, than to dwell upon transactions passed and closed, 
in an attempt to criticise or to find fault, or to point out how they might have 
been more wisely conducted and have brought better supposed results. Early I 
learned that criticism and fault-finding could be set up on very limited capital, 
and that the "better supposed results" are more imaginary than real. In fore- 
casting his supposed results the critic rarely foresees, or can foresee, the new and 
important factors which would be brought into the problem if the changes de- 
manded bv his after-date criticism had been made. Allow me. therefore, to engage 
the attention of the Senate briefly in considering what I deem to be present con- 
ditions and duties. 

First, then, let us inquire if the Constitution of the United States, r.r i^ropno 
vigorc, unaid* d by treaty or act of Congress, extends to and covers the inhab- 
itants of the territories acquired by the United States. 

This is an important question for consideration and determination, especially 
by every Congressman, whose action may help determine tlie laws which shall 
govern the inhabitants of such territories. 

TREATIES. 

By the recent treaty with Spain sovereignty is ceded to tho United States over 
Puerto Rico and the Phili[ipine Islands with this provision: 

Tlie civil and politic.il stntim of the native Inh.abitants of tho territo.-ies hereby ceded to the 
United States shall bo determined by Congress. 



Cuba, over which Spain relinquishes sovereignty and title, the tre.nty leaves 
without any derlaration in regard to the stdfufi of her inliahitants, or the rights 
of Congress" further than to say that, upon its evacuation by Si)ain, the island is 
to be occupied by the United States, and while such occupation shall continue the 
United States — 

will assume and discharge tho obligations that may. nndcr international law, result from th« 
fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and proiwrty. 

4188 3 



I do not propose in this connection to discnss what the relations of the United 
States to these islands are, further than to observe that the ceding power has 
iniposed no conditions nor reserved any rights defined and secured by the Consti- 
tution to the inhabitants of those islands. This distinguishes this treaty from all 
others hitherto made by the United States by which she has acquired teiTitory 
occupieu bv inhabitants. The treaty of IsOJ, for the cession of Louisiana, provides 
in Article ill that— 

The inlia!)itantsof tlie coJod torrltorvphall be incorporated in the Union of thcUnitfd States, 
and aJmittocl as soon a'' possible, accorilins to the priiicipk-s of the Kotleral Constitution, t<> the 
enjovnic-nt of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of the citizens of the United States; 
und "in the meantime they si. all bo maintained and protected in the free enjoymcut of their 
libertj-, property, and the relitpon which they profess. 

The treaty of 1S19, by wliich Florida was ceded to the United States, in Article 

VII has a provision of similar legal import. So have the treaties by which New 
Mexico, Utah, California, etc.. were acquired in IS is and I^.jU, contained in Articles 

VIII and IX of the treaty of 18 IS and brought forward into the treaty of l^i^i by 
Article V. The treaty of 1807, by which Alaska was acquired, has no provision 
for the inc rporation of the Territory into the Union as a State or States. It 
divides tht- inhabitants into two classes. It provides that they may return to Rus- 
sia within three years, and of those who do not return says : 

But if they should prefer to remain in the ceded territory thov. with the nx'^-if : <v. r,f the 
tincivilized native trilK.'s, shall l>o admitted to the enjoyment of all the riplr. .:.'! 

Imnninities of citiz'-usof the United Status .ind shall ho maintained and p;' a 

•njoyment of their lilierty, proi>frty, and religion. The uncivilized tribes - ',o 

■uch" regrulations as the United States may, from time to time, adopt in regard to uV'i.riginal 
tribes of that country. 

It is thus manifest that in every treaty by which the United States has acquired 
Inhabited territory prior to the late treaty with Spain the ceding power has inserted 
a provi-sion that the inhabitants, except uncivilized tribes, j-hall be admitted to the 
enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United 
States, and all. except that by which Alaska was acquired, contain the further 
provision that they shall in due time, to be determined by Congress, bo admitted as 
a State or States into the Union. 

SUPREME COURT DECISXOXS. 

It will be important to keep the pro\nsions of these treaties in mind, especially 
when we examine the decisions of the Supreme Court in regard to the constitu- 
tional rights ot tlio inhabitants of these territories. In his opinion in The Ameri- 
can and Oceanic Insurance Cos. is. 356 Bales of Cotton. Canter, claimant. Chief 
Justice Marshall quotes the sixth article of the treaty ceding Florida, which reads: 

The inhabitants of the territories which His Catholic Majesty codes to the United States by 
this treaty shall Ikj incorporated into the Union of the United States as soon as may be con- 
sistent with tlie ])rincipli»s of the Federal Constitution and adniitt»'d to thoen^'oymont of all the 
privilof^es. rights, and immunities of the citizens of the L'nited Stiites. It is 'unuece>sary to 
inquire wheiher thus is not tljeir condition independent of stipulation. Tlioy do not, however, 
particii>ate in political power; they do not share in government till Florida" becomes a State. 
(1 i'cters, SU:.) 

The Northwest Territory and other territories ceded by separate States to the 
United States, when under the Articles of Confederation or the Constitution, were 
ceded under a pledge from Congress in regard to their use and rights. Chief 
Justice Taney says in his opinion in the Dred Scott case: 

By resolution paswiod October 10, IT.'^n, Conpre.ss pledpred Itself that, if the lands were ceded as 
recoinmeudixl. they should In? disposed of tor the common benefit of the United States, to be 
•ettU'd and formed into distinct rejmblii'an States, which ehall become members of the Federal 
Uniiin. uud have the same rights of sovereignty and freedom and iudepeudence as the other 
States. 

This pledge acted upon is of equal force as the provision of a treaty, especially 
under the ordinance of 1787. 

These treaties and this resolution include all the territories of the United States, 
except that of Oregon, which came by discovery and occupation— in regard to 
which I know of no decision of tlie United Stat<^s Supreme Court on the question 
nndiT consideration— and, excejit that acquired by the annexation of Texas and 
Hawaii, until we come to the recent treaty with Spain. 

THE SCOPE OF THE TREATY MAKING rOWER, 

By Article VI of the Constitution: 

All treaties made under the authority of the United States are made the supreme law of the 
Und. 

41 S8 



Of tlio tieaty-makiiiEr power the Suineine C'uurt, in Geofiey jv. Riggs (133 U. S., 
258), speaking by Mr. Justice Field, says: 

The treaty power as expressed in the (V)nstitntion 1« in terms unlimited except by thoaa 
restraints found in that instrument nKJiiiist tlieaotionof the (tovernment.orof its departments, 
and thos(> arisin^; from the nutni'e of tlio Ho\crnment itself and that of tlie States; it would not 
bo contended tliat it extends so far as to autliuiize wliat th(> Constitution forbids, ora chan^co 'u 
tho charactei- of tlio Govorninent. or in tliat of tli"- States, or tlie <;ession of any i>ortion ot tho 
latter without its consent. Fort Leavenworth U. K. Co. r.i Lowe (lit U. S. '•i). .'iM >. Hnt with 
those exceptions it is not perceived that there is any limit tothequestions whii-ii can b:>adjudi;e;l 
touching any matter which is properly tho sub.ject of neirotiation witha foreitrn ctiiuitry. Ware 
vs. Hvlton i'^V. S., IWi; Chirac iv. Chirac ( l.'i V. S., :: NVheaton, -Vii; Ilau^nstine rs. Sanborn 
(100 \y. 8.. 4S3); Droit d" Aubaino (.'l Ops. Atty. Uon., 417); People r.i. (ierke (."> Col., ;isi ). 

It will not he claimed that the provisions of these treaties driving the inhabitants 
of the territories the rights. ]irivilegeg, and imuiiinities of citizons of the United 
States lie without the scope ot" the treaty-making power. It is a generally admitted 
proposition that the ceding power may properly reqnire such a provision in its 
treaty granting its sovereignty over a territory and that the power accepting the 
grant becomes solemnly bound thereby. 

DTSTKKT Of cor.rMni.\. 

Inasmuch as one or more of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
is in regard to the constitutional rights of the inhabitants of the District of Co- 
lumbia, it is proper to remark that the territory now included in the District 
when the Constitution was ado])ted constituted parts of the States of Virginia and 
Maryland, and before being ceded had become subject to the Constitution. By 
the cession the territory of the District was not taken from under the operation 
of the Constitution. If so. the process by which it was accomplished is unknown 
to me. Nor have I seen any suggestion by anyone that any change in its relation 
in this respect was made by its cession by the States to the United States. 

now DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COUUT SHOULD BE CONSIDEUEI). 

These ob.?crvations are necessary for the proper understanding of the language 
used by A'arious .iudges of the United States Supreme Court in their opinions 
touching the constitutional rights of the inhabitants of the District of Columbia 
and of tliese Territories; for. as aptly and pertinently said by Chief Justice Mar- 
shall in Cohen vs. Virginia (G Wheaton, 204, o99): 

It is a maxim not to be disregarded that general expressions in every opinion are to be taken 
in connection with tho case in which these oxi>res.sioiis are used. If they co beyond the caso 
they may be respjcted. but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when tho 
very point is presented for judgment. The reason for this maxim is obvious. The question 
actually before the court is investigated with care and considered in its full extent. Other 
principles which may servo to illustrate it are considered in thoir relation to the case decided, 
but their pos.-iil>le bearing upo'.i all other cases is seldom completely investigated. 

Keeping this caution by the eminent Chief Justice in mind, I fail to find any 
decision of the Supreme Court which fairly inilicates that the Constitution of the 
United States, unaided by Congressional legislation or by treaty, vx jiroprio rujore 
extends to the territories acquired bj' the United States. ' There are expressions in 
several of the opinions which would indicate that such might be the view of the 
writer. Such expressions were unnece-sary for the decision. In no case which I 
have been able to find is this point actually considered and decided. In every caso 
in which the court has decided that the party was entitled to be accorded the 
rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution, such rights, jirivi- 
leges, and immunities had been conferred by tho States from which the territori' 
was ceded, as in the case of the District of Columbia, or by tlie treaty by which 
the territory was ceded to the United States; and frequently tho riglits thus 
secured had been confirmed hy the act of Congress conferring territonal govern- 
ment. The resolutions and proceedings by which several Slate-! ceded territory to 
the United Stales, including tlie Northwest Territory, were in legal effect treaties 
and of like binding force. 

The decisions of the United States Supreme Court most generally relied upon to 
support the view that the Constitution, unaided by act of Congress or treaty, 
extends c.r propria vi'/orc to all territories may, for convenient consideration, Oe 
divided into three clas.ses: 

(1) The right of trial by .inry. 

(2) Revenue, or the apportionment of direct taxes. 

(3) Citizenship. 

THE laoHT or Tni.vr. bv juuy. 

Of the first class are Callan vs. Wilson (1C7 U. S.. olOi; American Publishing 
Company vs. Fisher (IGG U. S., 4G4); Springville r.s-. Thomas (166 U. S.. TuT;; 



Thompson vs. Utah (170 U. S., 343), and some others noted in these decisions. 
Calliin rs Wilson clearly holds that a citizen of the District of Columbia has con- 
stitutional right to trial bj- jurv when cliarged with a crime. Although not fully 
Slated as a ground for the decision, the case was correctly decided if. as I think the 
fact is, the Constitution was extended over the District while included in the States 
of Marvland aud Virginia, and was never subsequently withdrawn. The decision 
of the American Publishing Company r.s, Fisher was turned upon the point taken 
that the act of the Territory which authorized a verdict rendered on the concur- 
rence of nine or more members of the jury contravened the act under which Utah 
was constituted a Territory. It leaves undecided whether the seventh amendment 
applies. Mr. Justice Brewer summarizes the decisions on this point as follows: 



that 



Whether the seventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States, wliich provides 
at -in suits at common Inw, where the value in controversy t>bM exceed twf-nty d-jllars. tho 



rieht of trial l.v jurv shall bo preserved," operates, ex propria ivV/or?, to invalidate this statute 
mtvbo a matter of -dispute. In Webster to. Roid, 2 Howard. 4:!., an act of the lezr-lature of 
Iowa di.-^ponsinfr with a jury in a certain clas^of common-law actions was held void. W hileiu the 




be entitled to the benefit of the writ of habias corpus and of trial by jury 

have b -en adiudced bv reason of contlict with Conprrcssional lef^islation. - . , 

In Revnolds rs. Uni'ted States m U. S., 14.5. 154 1, it was said, m reference to a criminal caM 
couiiuK from tho Territory of Utah, that "by the Constitution of the Lnited St.ates (Amend- 
ment '^'■'> "'■» "'■'""^"'i «•'•« ontit-l.'d to ft trial bv an iinD.irtial jury." Both of those c.iFes were 




bv Mr Justice Bradley, speakiug for the court: "Doubtless Congress, in legisiaunc lor lue ler- 
ritories would be subject to those fundamental limitations in favor of personal nphts winch are 
formulated in tho Constitution and its amendments; but these limitations would exist rather 
by inference and the general spirit of the Constitution, from which Congress derives all its pow- 
ers than bv anv express and direct application of its provisions." And in McAllister i.*. L iiited 
States (141 'U. 8., 174) it is held that the constitutional provision in respect to the tenor of oudi- 
cial oflices did not apply to Territorial judges. 

If what has been said in regard to the force of the treaties by which these ter- 
ritories? were ceded is sound, the cases were all correctly decided, and .iustified, as 
is done in some of them, classifying the District of Columbia and Territories with 
States as protected by this provision of the Constitution. 

There can be no doubt that the treaty with Mexico secured to the inhabitants of 
the territory ceded the rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Consti- 
tution. By its terms Mexicans who should prefer to remain in the territory could 
retain the title and rights of Mexican citizens or acquire those of citizens of the 
United States. If they remained without election for a year after the cession of 
the cession of the territory, they— 

should bo considered to have elected to become citizens of the United States, * * * shall bo 
incorporated into tho Union of the United States, and be admitted at the proper time to the 
enjovniont of all tlio rights of citizens of tho United States, according to the principles of the 
Constitution, aud shaU bo protected in the free cnjojTnont of their liberty and property. 

These terms of the treaty were accepted Viy the United States, and secured to 
the inhabitants of tho torritorv the rights secured to citiy.eus of the United States 
by the Constitution. Trial by common-law jury was one of these rights. The 
fact that such terrilorv was secured the rights, immunities, and privileges of the 
Constitution, and was" in preparation, under the treaty, for becoming a State, 
justified tho remark of Mr. Justice Bradley in Mormon Church vs. United States: 

Doubtles.'i Congres-s. In legi-laf ing for the Territories, would bo subject to those fundamental 
limitati'.ns in favor of personal ri-lits which are formnl.ited in tho Constitution and its amend- 
ments: but these liniitations would exist r.ither by inference aud the general spirit of the Con- 
Btitntion, from which Couiiresd derives all its jiowers, than by any express or direct application 
of its provisions. 

These rights were secured by the treaty. Unquestionably these principles 
inipliedlv should govern the legislation of Congress regarding the inhabitants of a 
Territory which was being prepared to take its place among the States of the I nion. 

Tho ca.se of Spving^-illo r.s-. Thomas is made to rest upon the ground stated in 
American Publishing Conqianv v.<<. Fisher. Thompson vs. Utah was properly 
decided ui)on the ground that the act upon which the plaintiff in error was tried 
was passed after tho crime ( hargt d was committed, and unconstitutional as an 
er pDsl fartit law, an iinmunitv secured to him by the Constitution. None of these 
decisions read in the light of "the treaties or the law of the land extending over 
the District of Columbia and the Territories, uphold the claim that the Constitu- 
tion. «j- />rt./)ri"o i-u/o;.. jirevailed over ihoin. . , 1 T 

It is (luito evident that this must be the principle which controls when in re 

4188 



Ross (110 U. S.. 4").'^) is considered. Ho was a seaman on an AniPiican vessel. H« 
claimed to be a British subject. While {h<^ vessel was in harbrn- in Japan lie com- 
mitted thereon a mnvdcr. By an act of (.'oiifjvess, ])assed agreeably to a treaty 
between the United St.ites and Japan he could be tried by a consular court in 
Japan, consisting of the»American consul and four associates. The court and ita 
proceedings were regul.ir if the act of Congress was constitutional. Ho was tried, 
convicted, and sentencinl to be executed. On the trial he properly rai.-ed the 
points that he was entitled by the ('onstitutiou to be indicted by a grand jury and 
tried by a common law jury and that the consular court, as constituted, had no 
jurisdiction to try him. 

If the act establishing the consular court was unconstitutional when challenged by 
a citizen of the United States it was so when challenged by him, though a British 
subject. By shipping as a seaman on an Anu rican vessel ho liecame entitbd to 
be tried by valid laws applicable to the trial of an American citizen, Jlis sentence 
was commuted by the President to imprisonment for life in the penitentiary 
at Albany, N. Y. After remaming incarcerated for a time he brought halx-aa 
corpus, claiming that his incarceration was unlawful on the gi-ounds claimed by 
him on the trial. It was held that the American vessel, though on the high seas, 
common to all nations, was American territory, and under the treaty the consular 
court had jurisdiction to try him and his conviction was lawful. 1 can see no 
escape from the conclusion that this decision establishes that Cougi-ess has plenary 
power, unrestricted by the Constitution, in legislating for outside territories. 

REVENUE OR THE APPORTIONMENT OF DIRECT TAXES. 

Of the second class I have found but one decision which is claimed to hold that 
the Constitution, of its own unaided vigor, extends itself over the District of 
Columbia and Territories located outside the States, and that is Loughborough 
rs. Blake (5 Wheaton, 317). It was decided in 1820, Chief Justice Jlarshall deliv- 
ering the opinion. The question for decision was whether an act of Congress 
including the District of Columbia in an apportiomnent of a direct tax, according 
to the census of the States and District, was constitutional. It was held consti- 
tutional. It could not be otherwise held if the District was then under the Con- 
stitution. 

The reasoning of Chief Justice Marshall, as I understand it, is that it was imma- 
terial whether tlie District was under the provisions of the Constitution. In sub- 
stance he reasons that if in levj'ing a direct tax Congress should omit a State or 
not apportion the tax among the States according to the census, as prescribed 
in the Constitution, the tax would be unlawfullj' levied and void; that the same 
effect would not result if a Territory was omitted, because the Constitution does 
not require direct taxes in the Territories to be so apportioned; that in the Terri- 
tories Congress exercises plenary power in levying direct taxes, and in the exer- 
cise of this power could apportion the tax as retjuired by the Constitution among 
the States. I think the decision and reasoning of the eminent Chief Justice, prop- 
erly understood, does not support the doctrine, but the reverse. 

CITIZENSniI*. 

In considering citizenship I shall not discuss the Slaughterhouse cases and some 
others which are upheld, because the acts of the States complained of as infring- 
ing upon the rights of citizens secured by the Constitution were held to be valid 
within the police power of the State, althougii some expressions in the opinions 
may give the carele.^3 reader the impression tliat the Constitution extends over 
the District of Columbia and the Territories, unaided by act of Congress or by 
treaty, for if any such expressions can fairly be held to have such force, they 
were cleaidy outside the points considered and decided, and are no more than 
dicta. 

In United States w. Wang Kim Ark (ir.D V. S.. G19) it is held that the defend- 
ant in error, born of Chinese parents in California while his parents were resid- 
ing there, but were not and could not, under the laws of the United States, be 
naturalized, became a citizen of the United States under the fourteenth amend- 
ment. The case was decid- d by a divided court, after very full consideration. 
The majority of the judges hold that the common-law doctrine in regard to birth 
in a country, from foreign parents residing there, entitles the child to the pro- 
tection of the country, and for that reason he owes to such country allegiance and 
becomes a citizen under th<' terms of the amendment. 

There is force in the dissenting views of Chief Justice Fuller and Mr. Justice 
BEarlan, holding that the birth must be from parents who, by the hiws of the 
4188 



8 

country, could have become citizens by naturalization to give the child such a 
status. In the discussion in the opinion representing the views of the coxirt some 
expressions are used which carry the impression that such a birth in the Terri- 
toi-ies. or wherever the United States has jurisdiction, renders the child a citizen. 
But no such question was before the court, nor does tl\e opinion proftss to con- 
sider such a (jncstion. Tlie question involved may be correctly decided, and yet 
does not touch the doctrine tliat the Constitution extends to the District of Colum- 
bia and TeiTitories of its own unaided vigor. These are the strongest representa- 
tive cases claimed to indicate that the Constitution has such unaided power. 

THE CONSTITUTION. 

Opposed to its having such power are the nature and language of the Constitu- 
tion and many decisions of the Supreme Court. The Constitntion is that of a 
representative government of the people. It was formulated and adopted by rep- 
resentatives selected by and from the people of the different States to form a com- 
mon government for themselves under the name of the United States. This name 
is used throughout the instrument to mean the States united, or their combined 
power. The Constitution comuiences with — 

Wo, the peonle of the United States, in order to form ft more perfect union, • • • and 
■©curt! the bleisinKs of liberty to ourselves aud our posterity, do ordain and establish this Con- 
stitution for tho Uuited Statoa of America. 

United States as here used evidently is a synonym for the union of the States 
which should adopt it. The people of the States announced in advanr e that, 
through their representatives, they form the Constitation, among other things to 
secure the blessings of liherty to themselves and their posterity, and announced no 
other jrarpose. It is almost invariably held that the acts and laws enacted b.v the 
legal representatives of any municipality bind only the inhabitants of that munici- 
pality. Such acts and laws have, and' are intended to have, no extraterritorial 
effector jurisdiction. If any extraterritorial jurisdiction for such laws is intended, 
it must be clearly expressed, or tlio contrary will be ]/resumed. 

The several articles of the Constitntion, and the first ten amendments, adopted 
nearly contemporarily, establish the three departments of the Government, pro- 
vide for the manner of their establishment, define their respective powers, some 
both affirmatively and negatively' ; deline what jjower the States yield to the Gen- 
eral Government, and what they reserve, including its powers over the citizens of 
the several States, the relation of the States, and of the citizens of the several 
States, to each other, and to the General Government; liow and by whom the Con- 
stitution can be amended; provide for the adiuissiun of new States; and specify 
the power of the Government over the Territory and other property of the United 
States. 

Not a sentence contained in the original articles, nor the first ten amendments, 
adopted nearly contemporaneously, more clearly to specify the scope and limita- 
tion of the powers named in the original articles, indicates that these provisions 
areapi)lied to or bind anyone except the citizens of the several States, who, through 
their chosen representatives, framed and adopted lliera and are given power to 
annul and amend them. Nor is there any such sentence in the eleventh and 
twelfth anu-ndments. When the thirteenth amendment was framed and adopted 
it was therein clearly expressed that its provisions should extend not onlj- to tho 
States then included in the Union, or tliroughuut the Uuited States, but to any 
place subject to their jurisdiction. 

It is significant that this chiuse should be inserted into this amendment, and be 
nowhere found in the original articles, nor in the preceding nor succeeding amend- 
ments, if of their own vigor they extend wherever the L'nited States exercises 
jurisdiction. Especially significant is tlie insertion of this provision into this 
amendment, and its omission from the fonrtcenth and fiiteenth amendments fol- 
lowing so soon thereafter and formuhited by some of the same eminent constitu- 
ticmallawyers. It clearly shows that the men who formulated it did not think 
that tho other provisions of the Constitution, as then amended, extended of their 
own vigor into the Territories. 

Jn confirmation of this view is the fact, that up to that time all treaties ceding 
territories to tho Inited ."^tates contain carefully expressed provisions giving 
immediately its citizens the rights, jirivileges. and immunities of citizens of the 
United States, or providing that such riglits, privileges, aud immunities should 
speedily be conferred and the Territories formed into States. The commissioners 
who formulated those tre.ities, the Presidents who submitted them to the Senate, 
the Senators, or some ot them at least, who ratified tliem, were eminent constitu- 
tional lawyers, and some of them engaged in formulating and discu:-sing the orig- 
41 S8 



inal Constitution. It can hardly be conceived as possible thnt this line of action 
bIiouM havo been pursued for so many years, if tlie Constitution, of its own 
nuaided force, extends to every territory aciiuired by the United States. 

TERIUTORIES AND TERniTOniAIi COUnTS. 

Such -was not the view of Daniel Webster in 1828 when arguing American 
Insurance Company vs. Canter (1 Peters, oil). He then said: 

"What is Florida? It is no part of tho United States. How can it be? How is it reprcsentedf 
Do tho laws of tlio United St!it<;3 roach Flori.la? Not unloss by particular provisions. The ter- 
ritory and all within it are to bo govcrnod by tlio acriuiriiit: i)ovver. oxwpt wlitiro there are 
reservations by treaty. By tl;o law of Eu^,'lnnd, when possession is takrn of territories, tlie 
Kiug. Jure connuv. htxs tho i)ower of legislation until Parliament shall interfere. Coiiffross boB 
the ;'(.s- roroiuv in this case, r.ud Florida was to ho governed by Contfresa as she thonglit prop:"r. 

\Vhat has Congress done? .Slie might havo done anything; she might have refused tho right 
of trial by .iury, and refused a logislutaro. bhe h:vs given a logislatnro to be exorci.sod at her 
will: and a" government of a mixed nature, in which she has endeavored to distinguish between 
Stale and United States inrisdiction, anticipating tho future erection of tho territory into a 
State Does the law establishing the court at Key West come within the restrictions of the 
Constitution of tho United States? If tho Constitution does not extend over this territory, the 
the law can not be inconsistent with tho national Constitution. 

Such -was not the \iow of Chief Justice Marshall, who delivered the opinion in 
that case and therein said: 

These courts, then, are not constitutional conrts, In which the judicial power conferred by 
the Coi>stitntion on the General Government can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving 
it. They are legislative courts, created in virtuo of tho general right of sovereignty which 
exists iii the Government, or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress to make all need- 
ful rules and regulations respecting tho territory belonging to tho United States. Tho juris- 
diction with which they are invested is not a part of that judicial power which is defined in the 
Third Article of the Constitution, but is conferred by Congress in tho execution of those gen- 
eral powers which that body possesses over tho Territories of the United States. Although 
admiralty jurisdiction can bo exercised in the States in thoso courts only which are established 
in pursuance of the third article of the Constitution, the same limitation does not extend to 
tho Territories. In legislating for them Congress exercises the combined powers of the general 
and of the State government. 

Nor was such the view of Chief Justice Chase, as shown by an extract from his 
opinion in Clinton vs. Englebrecht (13 Wallace, 4o4), as follows: 

There is no snpreme conrt of the United States, nor is there any district conrt of the United 
States in the sense of tho Constitution, in the Territory of Utah. The judges are not appointed 
for the same terms, nor is the .iurisdiction which they exercise part of tho judicial power con- 
ferred by the Constitution of the General Government. Tho courts are tho legisLative courts 
of tho Territories, created in virtue of that clause which anthorizes ("ongi-ess to make all need- 
ful rules and regulations respecting the Territories Ijclonging to the United States. 

The same doctrine has been adhered to by the Supreme Conrt, as shown by the 
opinion in McAllister r.s. United States (141 U. S., 174), where the cases on the 
subject are reviewed. The courts brought under consideration in this line of cases 
are denominated legislative courts, courts established by Congress in the exercise 
of its plenary power over tho Territories, or the combined power of the General 
Grovernment and of the States, as it is sometimes e.xpressed: courts which do not 
derive their authority from the judicial power of the Cnited State.s, vested in the 
Supreme Court and inferior courts ordained agreeably to Article III of the Consti- 
tution, but derive their power from an act of Congress, even when it embraces tho 
identical oubject-matter— maritime— over which the Supreme Court is given juris- 
diction by Article III of the Constitution. These cases are distinguishable from 
those that hold that the citizen of the District of (.'olumbia. and of tho Territories, 
is entitled to be tried by a common-law jury. No person has the constitutional 
right to be tried by a particular court, if t!ie court which tries him accords all the 
rights, privileges, and immunities secured to him by tho Constitution. 

CITIZENS OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND OF TERRITOniES. 

Of like tendencv and force are the decisions of the Supreme Conrt holding that 
a citizen of the District of Columbia or of a Territory can not sue in the United 
States courts a citizen of a State, nor be sne<l in such courts by such citizen of a 
State, because the Constitution gives such courts jurisdiction only of suits between 
citizens of different States; that the District of Columbia or a Territory is not a 
State within the terms of the Constitution, whatever it may be internationally. 
(Hepburn ;•.%-. EUezy, 2 Cranch. 44."); New Orleans vs. Winter, 1 Whcaton, 91; Bar- 
ney r.s. Baltimore, G Wallace. 2S0.) These cases establish, if they establish any- 
thing, that the term State in the Constitution means one of the States of the Union 
and no other municipality. Bv parity of rea.sonmg. Unite.l States, when n.sed in 
that instrument, should mean the States united, and nothing more, unless clearly 
asserted, as in tho thirteenth amendment. 
41S8 



10 

DRED SCOTT DECISION'. 

Tho Dretl Scott decision is not opposecl to these views. Chief Justice Taney, as 
furnishing the foundation for holding that the phiiutiff in error was not entitled 
to sue in the United States courts, deliucs who are included as citizens of the 
United States within the terms of the Constitution. He bays: 

The words 'penple of the I'liited States" nnd " citizens "■ are synonymous terms, and mean 
tho same thinp. They both de.'<iril>e tho political body wlm. arcordinK to our rei)ubiican insti- 
tutions, form the soverei^'Uty and hold tho power and conduct the Government throuRh their 
reprcsenaitivos. Tliov are what we taniiliarly call the "sovereitrn people, "and every citizen is 
one of this people, and a constituent meuiLcr of this eovereipnty. 'Ihe question before us is 
■whether tho class of persons (negroes) described in the plea of abatement compose a portion of 
this people and are constituent nii'mbers of tliis sovereignty. Wo think they are not and are 
not inc-luded.and were not intended to be included, under the word citizens of the United States. 

This portion of the decision has not been criticised nor overruled to my knowl- 
edge. Under this definition of citizen he must have a part in the exercise of the 
sovereignty. Other portions of the opinion, if not overruled, have been ignored, 
especially that portion which holds that the chiu.se in the Constitution in regard 
to the power of Congress over territories ajiplies only to the territories belong- 
ing to the Ciiited States when the Constitution was adopted, or such as might 
be acquired to be developed into States. The case clearly holds that nntil the 
adoption of the fourteenth amendment there might be persons born and residing 
within the United States, subject to its powers and having a right to demand its 
protection, who are not citizens because not entitled to participate in the sover- 
eignty. That amendment enlarges this definition only to the extent of all persons 
born "in the United States and sub.iect to its jurisdiction. The term United States 
here must mean the territory of the States united to form the National Govern- 
ment. The words "and suliject to its jurisdiction" are not words of enlargement, 
as in the thirteenth amendment, but words of limitations of the class born in the 
United States, and were inserted to exclude children born of parents who wore 
residing in the United States as the representatives of other nations. 

DUCISIOXS IX IlEGARD TO THE HIOIITS OF INDIANS. 

Of like legal tendency and effect are the decisions of the Supreme Court in regard 
to the rights of Indians, as .shown in I'nited States cs-. Rogers. 4 Howard. 5(37; 
United States vs. Kagama. 11^ U. S.. :37.j: Elk vs. Wilkius. 112 U. S.. IM. and other 
cases relating to the relations of the United States to the Indians. In tho last case 
named tho plaintiff was an Indian, born among the tribe to whieh ho belonged. 
He sued the defendant for refusing to enroll him as a voter in the city of Omaha. 
He alleged that he was an Indian, born within the United States; that for more 
than a year prior to tiie grievances complained of he had severed his tribal rela- 
tions to the Indian tribes, and fully and completely surrendered himself to tho 
jurisdiction of the United States: that he was a c-tizen of the United States by 
virtue of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution, entitled to all the rights 
and privileges »>f the citizens of the United States, and had been a Immi jiilc resi- 
dent of the State and city for a period of time more than long enough to entitle 
him to vote. 

These allegations were admitted by demurrer. It was held that he was not a 
citizen of the Uniteil States bj* virtue of the fourteenth amendment, because bom 
with his tribe, and therefore owed suliordinate allegiam-e to it. The peculiar 
relations of the United States to Indians were discussed, and statutes shown which 
allowed them to le naturalizeil. On this branch of the case, and resjiecting the 
allegation that he was a citizen, it was held that this allegation and the allegation 
that hi> had severed his tribal relaticms and completely surrendered himself to the 
jurisdiction of the United States and of the State, were not suflicient to enable 
iiim to recover, unless accompanied, as they were not, by tlio furtlu r allegation 
that the Unite 1 Sates or State had accepted" his surrender, had naturalized him, 
or recognized him as a citizen. 

United States vs. Kagama establi.shes the right of this nation to govern the 
Indians liy acts of Congress instead of by treaties while they maintain their tribal 
relations on an Indian reservation within tho limits of a State: that, because 
within tlic geographical limits of the Unit<d States, they are neces.sarily sultject 
to the laws which Congress may enact for their i>rote(tion and for the protection 
of people with whom they conio in contact: that tho States have no such power as 
long as tii-y maintain tlieir tribal relations; that they owe no ;dl(\i,'ianco to the 
State, and the State gives them no i>rotection. Tlio opinion recognizes and dis- 
cusses the J), eiiliar relations of tlio (lovornment to tlie Indians; tliat Indians, 
while maintaining trilal relations, owe a subordinate allegiance to the tribe and 
a paramount allegiance to this Qoverumeut. 

4164 



11 

It would seem that in regard to citizenship paramount allegiance ought to con- 
trol. Sovereignty and allegiaiico are interdependent. Sovereignty is the para- 
mount power which governs and protects. From protection arises subjection, or 
duty to obey, or allegiance. It is dilVicult to discover any satisfactory reason dis- 
tinguishing' this case from In re Wang Ark Kim, except that the latter was born 
within a State, and therefore within the operation of the fourteenth aniendiiu-nt 
of the Constitution, and Kagama. on an Indian reservation, over wiiith the .Stato 
within whoso limits the reservation was had no .iurisdiction. and therefore was 
outside the operation of that amendment. Bc^th were bom under the sovereignty 
of the United States. The protection furni.^hed by the exercise of that sovereignty 
raised the duty of obedience to the lav.-s of the United States in both, the duty of 
protection and duty of obedience being intcrd(]icndeut. The subordinate control 
of the tribe over him did not amount to sovereignty \s'ithin its meaning in inter- 
national luv>'. 

INTF.KNATIOXAL LAW RESPECTIXG CEDED TERarrOIUES. 

Again, it is international law, ever}-where admitted and recognized, that the 
cession of sovereignty over a country bj* one nation to another aflects only the 
political relations of the inhabitants of the ceded country, and makes them sub- 
jects thereafter of the nation receiving the cession: that v.-hile the inhabitants of 
the ceded country change their allegiance, their relation to each other and their 
rights of property remain undisturbed. The cession of a country does not affect 
the rights of property. (Yattel, book 3, chap, lo, sec. SOU; United States vs. 
Perchman. 7 Peters, 51; Mitchell vs. United States, 9 Peters, 711; Strather vs. 
Lucas, 12 Peters, 410; American and Ocean Insurance Co. vs. Confer. 1 Peters, .111.) 

Laws, u>^ages. and municipal regulations in force at the time of cession remain 
in force imiil changed by the new sovereignty. The new sovereignty may deal 
with the inhabitants and give them what law it pleases unless restrauied by the 
treaty of cession, but until alteration be made the former law continues. (Cal- 
vin's Case, 7 Co., 17; Campbell r.s. Hall, Cowi.er. 20d; Mitchell vs. United States, 
9 Peters, 711; Cross et ai. vs. Harrison, IG Howard, 1G4.) Ci'oss vs. Harrison holds 
that this international law prevails in this country. The Constitution, therefore, 
can not of its own inherent force extend itself over such territory. It might be 
widvly at variance with the law of the ceded territory. Hence it follows that the 
Constitution, with the exception of the thirteenth amendment, does not extend, 
exjyvoprio viqorc, into the newly ceded dependencies, and the contracting nations 
could properly except uncivilized tribes from the rights, privi'eges, and inmiuni- 
ties of citizens in the treaty by which Alaska was acquired. Hence, the Sui^rfine 
Court properly has held that Congress has plenary power in legislating for terri- 
tories, unless restrained by the stipulation of the treaty, whether that powdr is 
derived impliedly from the treaty-making power— that the nation must have power 
to govern what it may lawfully acquire— or from section J of Article IV of the 
Constitution. 

Tlie cases hold that it is immaterial from which source the power comes. It is 
plenary or unlimited, from whichever source it springs. The cases following the 
Dred Scott decision refer to this section as an expression of this power. By it 
territory is treated, not as a part or portion of the United States, but as property 
belonging to the United States, and Cotigre^s is given plenary power to disiK)se of 
it, which it has no power to do if it constitutes a portion of the United States 
covered by the Constitution. If it were a part of the United States within the 
meaning of those words as used in the Constitution, on the fundamental princi- 
ples on which the Government is founded, the inliabitants of such territory bhould 
be clothed with the power of legislation under the Constitution, be represented in 
Congress, and have a voice in altering and amending the Cocstitution. In what- 
ever light it is viewed it is maniiVst that the Constitution, with the exception 
named, unaided does not extend to Puerto Rico and the Philijipme Islands, and 
that Congress, with this exception, is clothed with plenary power to legislate in 
regard to them; to make such rules and regulations respecting them as it regards 
needful, considering their situation and circumstances, untrammeled by the other 
provisions of the Constitution which secure particular rights, privileges, and immu- 
nities to citizens of the United States whoso property these ishmds are. 

If the Constittition, with the exception named, does not iu\ade these islands of 
its own force, it is manifest that its other provisions will not become operative 
there without an act of Longress. The treaty did not put them in operation there. 
It has been claimed that Congress by some indefinalle process impliedly puts them 
in operation as soon as it enters upon lepislat on lor the islands.fVtn without hav- 
ing passed any act to that eti'ect. In (juite a number of instant es the Supreme 
Court has said that in legislating lor the Territories Congress has plenary power, 
llss 



12 

or the coral lined power of the National Government and of the States. Such com- 
bined power must be absolute and unlimited, the power of any nation over such 
territories— except in regard to allowing slavery — or, in the language of section 3, 
Article IV, of the Constitution: 

Power to disijoso of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and 
other projierty b.-loiiping to the United States. 

The power of the States in enacting laws is not confined within the limits pre- 
scribed for the National Government by the Constitution. It is absolute except 
in the particulars surrendered to the National Government. There are number- 
less decisions of the Supreme Court to this effect on the subject of "due process 
of law'" or the " law of the land." In Missouri vs. Lewis (101 U. S., 22, 31) Mr. 
Justice Bradley says: 

We might go still further and say, with nndoubted truth, that there is nothing in the Consti- 
tution to prevent any State from adopting any system of laws or judicature it sees fit for all or 
any part of its ti-rritory. If tlie State of Kew York, for example, should tee fit to ado])t the civil 
law and its methods of procedure for New York City and the surrounding counti>'s. and the 
common law and its method:! of procedure for the rest of the State, there is nothing iu the Con- 
stitution of the United States to prevent its so doing. 

And Mr. Justice Brown, in Holden vs. Hardy (169 U. S., 866}, after quoting the 
foregoing, says: 

We have seen no reason to donbt the soundness of these views. In the future growth of the 
nation, as lieretofore, it is not impossible that Congress may see fit to annex territories whose 
jurisprudence is that of the civil law. One of tlie considerations moving to such annexation 
might hs tho very fact that the territory so annexed should enter the Union with its tniditions, 
laws, and systems of administration unchanged. It wt.uld lio a narrow construction of tho C'o'i- 
stitution to require tlieni to abandon these, or to substitute for a system which rejiresented the 
growtliof generations of inhabitants a jurisprudence with which they had no previous acqualnt- 
uuco or sympathy. 

These decisions are forcibly to the point that Congress, in the exercise of the 
combined powers of the National Government and of the States, has unlimited 
power in legi!^lating for the.-e islands, with the exception of allowing slavery, and 
does not thereby impliedly confer upon their inhabitants the other rights, 
privileges, and immunities secured to the citizens of the United States by the 
Constitution. Doubtless the citizens of the United States, fully imbued with the 
principles of the Constitution, will see to it that no Congress will ever exist which 
will not confer upon the inhabitants of these islands all the rights, privileges, and 
immunities secured by the Constitution, so far as they are applicable to their 
condition and circumstances. 

lir.I.-VTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES TO THESE DEPENDENCIES. 

While, under these views. Congress enters upon the government of these depend- 
encies unrestrained by the provisions of the Constitution, nevertheless it will 
exercise this power tmder the obligation of a general duty, to be discharged faith- 
fully and honestly for the highest welfare of their inhabitants, and of the inhabit- 
ants of the nation. Every function of government is a duty so to be discharged. 
As applied to Puerto Rico and the Pliilippine Islands the duty is general. It is so 
left by the treaty. 

nEi.ATioNs TO rrn.\. 

In regard to Cuba tho duty is particular. It is so constituted by the re.solutions 
antedating tlio war and l)y the provisions of the treaty. The prtaiuiileof the .ioint 
rei^olution of Conu'ress appvo\ed April 'JO. is'.iS. counts upon the abhorrent condi- 
tions which have existed in that island for more than three years, shocking to the 
iiK>ral sense (.f the penplu of the United States, a di.sgrace to Christian civilization, 
culminating in th(> destrnciion of tiie Mttiin with "JbG of its oflicers and crew, and 
thereupon it is solemnly resolved, (1) That the people of the island are, and of 
right ought to be, free and indejiendent. (2) That it is the duty of this Cioveru- 
meiit to demand, and it does demand, that Spain at once relin(iuisi) its authority 
an<i government of the island. (li) Authorizes the President to use the entire land 
ami naval forces, and to call out tlie militia to enforce the demand. (4) The 
United States disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise .sovenignty, .iuris- 
diction, or control over the island excejit for the iiacitication thereof, ami then 
asserts its delerminaliou to leave the government and control of the island to its 
people. 

The.se were followed by the act approved April 2."), declaring that a state of war 
had existed between the United States and Spain since April 21. and directing and 
empowering tho Pn^sident to use the entire land and naval forces and to call into 
the service the militia of tho I'nited States in tlie prosecution of the war. The 
Presidi'iit exercised tlie power conferred, obeyed the direction, jirosecuted the war 
to a successful termination, resulting first in the protocol and then in the treaty 
ratified by the Senate, by which Spain relinquishes her sovereignty over Cuba, 

4183 



13 

antl tlio United States annoniicos to tho world that sbo is about to occupy anfl, 
while the occupation continues, she — 

will assTimo and disoharpo the oljlijrat ions tlint may. nntlpr International law, result from th« 
fact of its occupatioD for tlio jirotoctiou of lito and i)roi)erty. 

The United States is now in the exorcise of such occupation. It has been claimed 
that she did not take sovonijj;nty over the island; that ou tlie reliniiuislimeiit by 
Spain it vanished into thin air to some place unknown, or, as one eminent writer 
on international law has said, was in abeyance until the inhabitai)t.s of tho island 
should bo in condition to receive and exercise it. Sovereignly is supremo or para- 
mount control in the {government of a country. The United States is now, and 
has been since the sipnin;,' of the protocol, in the exercise of this control in the 
government of tho island. It has not been a divided control, as sometimes happens 
in the conflict of arms. Her control has been unquestioned and undi-puted. I 
think the United States, upon the surrender of sovereignty over tho island by 
Spain, immediately following tho signing of the protocol, took sovereignty over 
tho island, not as her own. nor tor her benefit, nor for the people of tho United 
States, but for the inhabitants of the island, for the specitied and partieular pur- 
pose of pacitication of the island. What ismeant by the pacification of the island? 
It may be diilicuit to determine. 

Persons and nations may differ in regard to the state of things which must exist 
to have this accomplished. The Cubans may say that they are pacified, in a state 
of peace now. and therefore it is our duty to withdraw and allow them to set up 
such a government as they may choose. We may .say that pacification means 
more than absenee of a state of war: that, considering the state of things that had 
existed for three or more years, it means until the inhalntants shall have acquired 
a reliable, stable government. Are the Cubans capable of e.^tablishing and main- 
taining ."i stable government? Who shall decide? If that be the meaning, what 
kind of a governm^mt? A monarchy, a desi'Otism abhorrent to tho fundamental 
principles that have ruled and inspired this nation from its origin? Who can tell? 
Then the announcement makes no provision for any return by such government, 
when established, for the expenditures and obligations incurred in prosecuting 
the war and administering the sovi reignty. 

Is the United States to receive such compensation? She became a volunteer in 
the war. and anntninced herself such volunteer in taking tho sovereignty until 
pacification is accomplished. As such the United States stands to-day before the 
civilized nations of the world. The inhabitants of Cuba are the beneficiariei of 
this volimtarily assumed duty, and when a difference arises between this Gov- 
ernment and tliem, whether the duty has been performed and whether this nation 
is to be compensated for the expense of its administration, have a right to arraign 
this nation at the b.ar of nations and demand that it give account of the steward- 
ship wliich it voluntarily as.-umed. The determination of the rights of this nation 
and of tho Cubans under this assumed duty may involve many nice (luestions and 
many diOieulties. 

SHOVLD THE UXITKD STATES EXTEND THESE REI-ATIOXS TO rUERTO RICO AND THE PHILIP- 
PINE ISLANDS? 

Yet thore are those wh<5 earaestly urged that Congress should make a declara- 
tion that the nation holds Puerto iiico and tlie rhilii)piue Islands under the same 
undefined, yet in a sense partictilar, duty. In my judgment, such a course is beset 
with complications and diflicullios. By adopting it the nation Vvould court these 
and invite the inhabitants of the islands to engender perplexing qnestiona and 
entanglements. I'nder the treaty the nation takes the sovereignty of Puerto Rico 
and of the Philippine Islands, under the general duty to use it in such a manner 
as Congress may judge will best subserve the highest interests of their inhabitants 
and the inhabitants of this nation. I would announce no othf r duty in regard to 
them. Many more complications and entanglements may arise in the discharge 
of thep;irticular duty to Cuba than are likely to arise in the aischarge of the gen- 
eral duty to Puerto Rico and the Philii)piue Islands. 

CONGRESS SHOULD ANNOUNCE NO POLICY EXCEPT THE FLAG. 

It is urged that this nation should annonnce the policy of its purpose in the 
administration of the sovereignty. The flag of tho nation h.as been jdanted on 
those islands. Tbat is the emblem of its policy, and ever hiia been, even when at 
half-mast, mourning the loss of her sons slain in its defense. The flag never did, 
and I hope never may. represent but one policy. Thar policy is individual man- 
hood; the right to enjoy religious and civil liberty; the right of every man to 
believe in and worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience; the 

4188 



14 

right to stand protected equally with every other man liefuro the law in the enjoy- 
ment of freedom, of personal rights, and of property. 

Let the flag, as thu representative of these principles, be planted and become 
dominant on and over every island and every inhabitant. No other, no better, 
policy can be proclaimed. In no other way can this Congi-ossand nation discharge 
Its duty to the peojde of the United States and to the poople of the islands. Con- 
gress should jtroflaim this policy by its acts and make no attempt to do what it 
has no power to do— to pledu;e or limit the acticn of future Congresses. What 
future Congresses shall do is for theni to determine and proclaim. It can not be 
assumed that wisdom will die with the present Congress, nor that it is any part 
of its duty to proclaim v/hat future Congresses shall do. Sufficient unto the day 
is the duty thereof. 

COXSEXT OF THE IXnAHITAXTS OF ISLAXDS XOT Itr.QUinni). 

If these principles are enforced as far as applicable to the government of these 
Islands, the inhabitants will be blessed, whether they consent thereto in advance 
or not. In a rei)resentative government the right to govern is not derived from 
the consent of the governed until they arrive at a stage of advancement which 
will render them capable of giving an intelligent consent. Four-fifths of the 
inluihitants of this country have given no consent except representatively. The 
consent of women, as a rule, and of minors is never required, nor allowed to be 
taken. Wives and children are assumed to be represented by husbands and 
fathers. Bovs are to be educated, trained, and ripened into manhood belore they 
are capable of giving consent. Doubtless the boys of fifteen in this country are 
better prepared to give an intelligent consent than are the inhabitants of those 
islands. This is not their fault. After having lived for more than three hundred 
years under a government of oppression and practical denial of all rights, it is not 
wonderful that they are not capable of .iudgmg how they should be governed. 
They are to be trained in these principles: tirst. by being allowed, under experi- 
enced leaders, to put them in practice in the simpler forms of government, and 
then be graduallv advanced in their exercise, as their knowledge increases. 

All accounts agree that the administration of justice in the islands through the 
courts has bet-n a farce; that no native could establish his rights or gain his cause, 
however righteous, against the Spaniards and priests: that therein bribery and 
every form of favoritism and oppression prevailed. Under such training and 
abuse falsehood and deceit have become prevalent. These most discouraging 
traits of character can not be changed in a generation, and never except by pure, 
impartial administration of justice througli the courts, regardless of who may be 
the parties to the controversies. In my judgment, the people of this nation obtain 
more and clearer knowledge of their personal and property rights through the 
administration of justice in the courts than from all other sources". 

WHAT EXl'EUIEXCE TEACUES. 

All experience teaches that the requirements and impartial practice of the prin- 
ciples of civil and religious liberty can not speedily l>e ac luired by the inhabitants, 
left to their own way. under a protectorate by this nation. The experience of 
this nation in governing and endeavoring to civilize the Indiana teaches this. For 
about a centurv this nation exercisi-d. in fact, a prolei-t orate over the tribes, and 
allowed the natives of the country to maiiagc their tribal and other relations in 
tiieir own wav. The advancement in civilization was very slow and hardly per- 
ceptible. During the comparatively few years that C'ongress lias, by direct legis- 
lation, controlleil tlieir relation to each other and to the reservations tiie advance-, 
ment in civilization has been ten-fold more rapid. This is in accord with all 
experience. The untaught can not become ac(iuainted with the ditlicult prob- 
lems of government and of individual rights, and their due enforcement, without 
skillful gui<lea. 

No practical educator would think of creating a body of skilled mechanics by 
turning the unskilhd loose in a machine shoj). He would jdaco there trained super- 
intendents and guides to impart information to their untaught brains and to guide 
their unskilled hands. It is equally true that they would never become skilled 
without using th-ir brains and h.iu Is in oi)eratiiig the machines. So, too, if this 
nation would sm-cessfuUy bring llie inliabitants of these islands into the practice 
of the principles of religious ami civil liberty, it must both give them the opjior- 
tunity to bo taught in, and to i)r.ictice them, lirst in their simpler forms and then 
in their higher jipiilic.iiion. but under competent and trained teachers and guides 
placed over tiiem bv tiiis nation. 

It is equally true" that the laws and customs now prevailing must neither be 
pushed one side nor chang(>d too suddenly. They must be permeated gradually 
by the leaven of civil ai.d religious liberty until the entire population is leavened. 
ass 



15 

To accomplish this without mistake, in the intcrost of the people of tliis nation 
and of the inhahitants of tlio islaiuls, is a most Oillicult task, dcuiandini; honesty, 
intelligence, and the greatest c;iro and good judgnu nt. The task is rendered much 
more dilhcult hecause the people of the islands have hitherto heen governed by 
the application of the direct opposite of these principles, and are comi)osc'd of great 
nnmliers of tribes, speaking ditlorcut dialects and languages, and governed by 
different customs and laws. 

SEPARATE DErAKTM?:NT OF GOVKUNMENT DEMANDED. 

The successful solution of this problem demands accurate knowledge of the 
present conditions of the entire population, and of the different cla.sscs. of their 
respective habits, customs, and laws. As the principles of civil and religious lib- 
erty are gradnaily intermingled with their juescnt customs, habits, and laws, 
changes will be constantly going forward. An intimate knowledge of these ciianges 
will also be necessary for then- successful government. Hence, as a rirst step to 
a successful discharge of this duty. Congress should create a department of gov- 
ernment, cliarged with the sole duty to bt-como accurately acfiuainted with and to 
take charge of their affairs, and place exact knowledge of them before Congi-ess 
for its guidance. They should nut, as now, be left in charge of departments over- 
loaded and overworked. 

APrOlNTMEN'TS Ml'ST BE MADE XONPOI.lTTCAt,. 

Tlie second step to be taken is to remove all civil appointments in the islands 
from the realm of politics. The nation will utterly fail in the discharge of its 
duty if the ishnids are made political footballs, subject to change in gor\-evnment 
with every jtolitical change in the Administi'ation. The administration of the 
soveignty "must be intelligent, honest, and uninterrupted. A faithful, inteUigent 
man.with a lull knowledge of the situation, must not be displaced to give place 
to one ignorant of the conditions, however capable otherwise. The duty rests 
upon the entire nation. It must be discharged for the interest of whole nation. 
There are honest, capable men in every political party. These should be sought 
out and given place in the administration of this sovereignty, as nearly as maybe 
in pro; ortion to the strength of the several political parties in the nation. Then, 
■when there is a political change in the Administration, there will be no induce- 
ment to make extensive changes in the administrative appointees of the sovereignty. 

CONCLUSION. 

Difficult as is the administration of this sovereignty, if honestly and intelli- 
gently imdertaken such administration, I believe, will be beneficial both to the 
people of this nation and to the inhabitants of the islands. Difficulties which 
have come as these have come— unsought— honestly and faithfully encountered, 
bring wisdom and strength. The stvug-^le for nearly a century in this nation over 
shivery gave wonderful wisdom, strength, and clearness of insight into the great 
principles which the nation is now called upon to apply to these oppressed islands. 
Stagnation is decay and ultim:ite death. Honest struggle, endeavor, and discus- 
sion bring light. grov>-th, development, and strength. The primary object to be 
attained by the discharge of this duty is the elevation of the inhabitants of the 
islands physically, meiitally, and morally; to make them industrious, honest, 
intelligent, liberfy-loving, and law-abiding. This end attained, the secondary 
object— commercial and material growth among them and among the surround- 
ing millions— will surely follow. The first unattained. the second at Lest will be 
spasmodic and of little worth. 

The intelligent, thoughtful observer sees more in nature and in the ordering of 
the affairs of this world than the ungiiided plans and devices of men and nations. 
For him the wisdom of the Eternal shapes the affairs of men and of nations, .some- 
times even against their selfish plans and desire.s. For such His hand planted the 
seed of individual manhood and for centuries watched over and cared tor it in its 
slow growth amidst infinite sufferings, struggles, and conflicts, until, at length, 
planted on these shores, not entirely in its i)urity. bat at last brmight to full 
fruit.ige in the terrible struggles nnd conlliets which ended with the civil war. 
Under Him no man, no nation, lives to itself alone. If it has received much, 
much must it give to the less favored. Under His guidance. I believe, the dis- 
charge of this greatand difhcult duty has fallen, unsought, tothe lot ot this nation. 
Then let the nation take up the duty which the Ruler of men and nations h.as 
placed upon it: go forward in an honest, unselfish, intelligent, earnest end-avor 
to discharge it for the highest interest of the nation and of the islands, in the fear 
and underthe direction of the Supreme Uuler . who guided the fathers and founders; 
and the nation will not, can not, encounter failure. 
4188 

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